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Abstract
Software agents’ ability to interact within different open systems, de-
signed by different groups, presupposes an agreement on an unambiguous
definition of a set of concepts, used to describe the context of the in-
teraction and the communication language the agents can use. Agents’
interactions ought to allow for reliable expectations on the possible evo-
lution of the system; however, in open systems interacting agents may
not conform to predefined specifications. A possible solution is to define
interaction environments including a normative component, with suitable
rules to regulate the behaviour of agents.
To tackle this problem we propose an application-independent meta-
model of artificial institutions that can be used to define open multiagent
systems. In our view an artificial institution is made up by an ontology
that models the social context of the interaction, a set of authorizations to
act on the institutional context, a set of linguistic conventions for the per-
formance of institutional actions and a system of norms that are necessary
to constrain the agents’ actions.
1 Introduction
Since the advent of the Internet, about ten years ago, the landscape of computer
science has substantially changed. For the first time, it has become feasible to
develop open distributed systems, that is, software systems whose components
can aggregate dynamically and are free to enter and leave an interaction at
their will. In an open distributed system, the interacting agents are typically
designed and implemented by different parties, and may represent conflicting
interests, as it happens for example in e-commerce applications. This fact has
two important consequences. The first is that interaction will not even be
possible unless agents are designed to comply with well-defined standards. The
second consequence is that interaction will not lead to coherent outcomes unless
∗Partially supported by Swiss National Science Foundation project 200021-100260, ”An
Open Interaction Framework for Communicative Agents”
1
the agents’ behaviour is suitably regulated. The first problem (i.e., the problem
of standards) has been tackled by a number of organizations, including FIPA, the
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (http://www.fipa.org). The second
problem (i.e., the problem of regulating interactions) is much more elusive, and
has become an important object of research at least since Noriega’s and Sierra’s
works on electronic institutions in the late nineteen-nineties [22, 21]. Since then,
several authors (see for example [12, 1, 32, 34, 10, 4]) have contributed to the
specification of electronic institutions and artificial institutions [15, 35].
An electronic institution is usually viewed as a set of norms, which the agents
interacting within an open distributed system ought to follow [21]. Interaction
protocols themselves can be conceived as sets of norms (about what an agent
may do and when), and are the most obvious component of an electronic insti-
tution [10]. As a whole, the function of an electronic institution is to guarantee
that if its norms are followed by all agents, the interaction will produce a de-
sirable outcome. Indeed, it is part of the very concept of an autonomous agent
that norms may be violated; the system implementing an electronic institution
ought to detect such violations and to manage the situation, for example by
applying suitable sanctions. Given that norms are an essential component of
social reality (see for example [27]), we can regard electronic institution as a
means for imposing a well-defined structure to the social reality within which
agents interact. However, norms are just one component of social reality; other
components, which also seem to us to be important for the specification of open
distributed systems, have been largely neglected by most proposals concerning
electronic institutions. For this reason we would like to put forward an extension
of the concept of an electronic institution, that we call “artificial institution”.
Social reality is that part of the world that exists only because it is collec-
tively accepted as existing by a group of agents. Norms are an obvious example
of something that exists only because it is commonly recognized by the members
of some community; other important components are: (i) a socially defined on-
tology, and (ii), linguistic conventions. Let us briefly analyse these components.
Institutions not only regulate, but also create components of social reality.
For example, the institution of ownership does not just regulate a pre-existing
piece of reality, but creates the very concept of owning something. In other
words, an institution introduces a new ontology, including a set of entities with
their properties and relationships. A very important class of entities created
by an institution is the set of institutional actions. For example, actions like
selling and buying, renting and hiring, lending and borrowing (and, in fact, also
stealing) are only meaningful within a suitable institution of ownership.
Contrary to natural actions, like eating or walking around, institutional ac-
tions cannot be executed only by exploiting physical abilities. Rather, they
require suitable conventions that allow agents to perform institutional actions
by producing certain forms of behaviour, typically linguistic behaviour. The
need of specifying linguistic conventions for open distributed systems has been
recognised at least since the definition of KQLM [13]. Since then, Agent Commu-
nication Languages (ACLs) have been an important subject of research. Early
models of multiagent systems tended to regard ACLs as local to every specific
system (or even to every pair of roles in the system, as suggested by the Aalaadin
model [18]). Later research in agent communication, however, highlighted the
importance of defining a universal ACL [8, 30]. Moreover, some approaches
to the semantics of ACLs show that the very definition of a communication
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language may be based on elements of social reality, like the concept of com-
mitment [29, 5, 6]: if this approach is correct, ACL messages can be understood
only within a suitable system of artificial institutions.
In general, producing an instance of the correct conventional behaviour is
necessary but not sufficient to perform an institutional action. For example,
the president of society can open the annual meeting by saying “The meeting
is open”, while a generic member of the society cannot do the same. The issue,
here, is power or, as we prefer to call it, authorization: institutional actions are
successful only if they are performed by an authorized agent, and authorizations
are typically associated to the roles played by the agent in the institution. Even
authorized actions, however, cannot always be performed freely. For example,
the owner of a car is authorized to sell it, but may be prohibited to do so by his
or her spouse. Given the authorizations of the car owner, the action of selling
will have its normal institutional effects, but it will also violate the commitment
that the owner has with his or her spouse (in this example two institutions,
ownership and marriage, interact).
This brief analysis shows that institutions are made up by a number of
components: an ontology (including the definition of institutional actions), a
set of authorizations to perform institutional actions (typically associated to
roles), a set of linguistic conventions for the execution of institutional actions,
and a system of norms regulating the agents’ interaction. All these components
are so strictly interconnected that they have to be dealt with within a single
conceptual framework. The metamodel of artificial institutions that we propose
in this paper is an attempt to define such a framework. Our presentation is
structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our metamodel of artificial
institutions, defining their fundamental concepts and relationships. In Section
3 an example of the specification of an artificial institution, the Basic Institution,
is presented. Using the notion of commitment defined by the Basic Institution,
in Section 4 we present our operational definition of norms. Finally, in Section
5 we conclude with a brief discussion of related work and open questions.
2 A Metamodel of Artificial Institutions
Artificial institutions are models of institutional reality which specify a class of
interaction domains by exploiting a set of common concepts and notations. For
this reason we introduce a metamodel of artificial institutions, called OCeAN
(Ontology CommitmEnts Authorizations Norms), to describe an abstract syn-
tax and a semantics for each construct that characterizes artificial institutions.
In our view the fundamental components of an artificial institution are: a core
ontology for the definition of institutional entities and actions, and for the spec-
ification of roles and events, a set of conventions and authorizations for the
actual performance of institutional actions, and a set of ECA-rules that are
crucial for the definition of norms. In Figure 1 the abstract syntax of our artifi-
cial institution metamodel is presented by means of a notation inspired by the
UML metamodel [24], showing the fundamental concepts and the relationships
existing between them.
Even if we have adopted a notation inspired by UML, we are not prescribing
that artificial institutions and agents acting within them should be implemented
by object oriented technologies. In fact, artificial institutions are intended to
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Figure 1: The artificial institution metamodel.
specify institutional reality for open multiagent systems, which are characterized
by the fact that heterogeneous agents realized with different technologies and
by different organizations should interact. Therefore, it is important that the
specification does not commit to a specific implementation language, platform,
or internal architecture. For this reason, we do not exploit most of the features
of object oriented technologies, like methods or polymorphism, and to avoid
confusion we will not talk of classes. Therefore, we do not adopt the meta-
metamodel of UML1, which introduces, among others, the concept of MetaClass
and MetaOperations.
We use UML as a starting point, reusing its well known graphical notation
and the Object Constraint Language (OCL [23]) as our language to express
constraints. An advantage of this approach is that it employs concepts that are
close to the intuition and knowledge of practitioners. We believe the metamodel
we have developed can be easily understood by software engineers who design
and implement open multiagent systems.
Like the metamodel of UML, our metamodel of artificial institution has
a declarative semantics and suppresses implementation details. Therefore, we
abstract away from methods and implementation issues and provide an abstract
syntax to specify agent interaction systems.
In this paper we do not propose a specific architecture for the management
of institutional states in real systems, because we think that different archi-
tectures may be chosen and adapted according to the needs of real systems.
Anyway, agents using the interfaces specified through an artificial institution
model should not even notice the existence of such design and implementation
choices.
In the following sections we shall introduce a notation for the components of
artificial institutions and describe their meaning in natural language, whereas
1For reason of conciseness we do not discuss our meta-metamodel and the relations existing
between it and the meta-metamodel defined by UML.
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the metamodel reported in Figure 1 provides a set of well-formedness rules for
a model of an artificial institution. In Section 3 we will exemplify our approach
by defining a model of a specific institution, the Basic Institution.
2.1 The Core Ontology
2.1.1 Entities
In our view, artificial institutions are a technological extension of human reality
and therefore they should represent part of the state of the real world. We
assume the existence of external ontologies defining classes of entities, their
relationships and the relevant attributes representing physical properties. For
example, an entity may represent a book, which may have a number of pages
and a weight. We represent entities, attributes and relations with UML class
diagrams.
The core ontology is introduced to define new features relative to such entities
which exist only thanks to agents’ common agreement. For instance, the price
of a product on sale exists only because a community of agents recognizes such
a property.
For this reason we distinguish between two types of attributes that can
be associated to the definition of entities: natural attributes, which represent
physical properties and are defined by external ontologies, and institutional
attributes, which reflect the existence of a common agreement and are introduced
by core ontologies.
Sometimes, core ontologies define entities whose attributes are only institu-
tional, like the commitment entity defined by the Basic Institution described in
Section 3. We refer to such entities as institutional entities.
2.1.2 Institutional Actions
In our framework we assume that agents can modify only institutional attributes
by performing a particular set of actions, that is, institutional actions [7]. An
institutional action describes how institutional attributes change as a conse-
quence of its performance. For example, the effects and preconditions of the
act of opening an auction may be described in terms of certain values assumed
by the institutional attribute state, which represents the current state of an
auction.
More precisely, an institutional action is characterized by:
• an action name;
• a possibly empty set of parameters;
• a possibly empty set of preconditions, which specify the values that certain
institutional attributes must have for the action to be meaningful (for ex-
ample, opening an auction is meaningful only if the auction is not already
open);
• a nonempty set of postconditions, which specify the values of certain in-
stitutional attributes after a successful performance of the action.
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Preconditions and postconditions of institutional actions are expressed through
OCLExpressions [23], which can refer only to the parameters of the institutional
action or institutional attributes defined by the core ontology, reflecting the fact
that the only effect of an institutional action is to modify institutional attributes.
Because institutional actions change institutional attributes, which exist only
thanks to common recognition, it follows that institutional actions have an in-
trinsic social nature. Therefore, agents cannot perform such actions by exploit-
ing causal links occurring in the natural world, as it would be done to open
a door or to move a physical object. Furthermore, a crucial condition for the
actual performance of institutional actions is that they must be public, that
is, made known to the relevant agents by means of some action that can be
directly executed by an artificial agent. In the human world such actions vary
from certain bodily movements (raising one’s arm to vote), to the use of specific
physical tools (waving a white flag to surrender), to the use of language (saying
“the auction is open” to open an auction). We assume that in a multiagent sys-
tem all institutional actions are performed by means of a single type of action,
namely exchanging a message.
2.1.3 Roles
Authorizations, as the metamodel reported in Figure 1 shows and norms (as we
will explain in Section 4) are not related to specific individual agents but to sets
of agents identified by means of roles. Roles are therefore an interface between
authorizations and norms and concrete agents defined in an artificial institution.
For example the president, the secretary, and the participants of a meeting are
three roles and in fact the institution of meetings defines different authorizations
and norms that apply to the agents that fill such roles. In general, a sound
specification of an artificial institution cannot define a role with an empty set
of authorizations or ECA rules.
2.1.4 Events
A core ontology also describes a set of events which are relevant for the definition
and activation of ECA rules (see Section 2.3). UML models four kinds of events
[24]: signals, calls, passing of time and change in state. Unfortunately, the
notation proposed in UML for modeling events is bound to features of State
Machine and Statechart Diagrams, while we need a way to describe events in
general.
In our framework, an event type can have attributes, providing information
about the state transition that caused it, and it is possible to model hierarchies
of event types. Moreover we assume that every event has a time attribute
reporting the time at which an event has occurred. In our formalization we
have singled out three main categories of events:
• a TimeEvent, which occurs when the system reaches a certain instant of
time;
• a ChangeEvent, which happens when an institutional entity changes in
some way. This kind of event type can be further specialized:
– anAttributeChange, which is registered when an attribute has changed
its value.
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– a RelationChange, which happens when a new relation is created or
an existing one between two institutional entities is dropped.
– a GeneralizationChange, which occurs when an entity modifies its
type in a given taxonomy.
• an ActionEvent, that happens when an agent perform an action. In partic-
ular, an interesting type of this kind of events is ExchMsg, which represents
the act of exchanging a message.
The definition of event types allows us to define event templates, that is,
event types that have some restriction on certain attributes and describe a set
of possible event occurrences. Event templates are used in the on section of
ECA rules to specify what kind of domain dependent events activates a rule.
2.2 Count-as Relation, Authorizations, and Conventions
Given that institutional actions modify institutional attributes that exist only
thanks to agent common agreement, agents cannot directly perform such ac-
tions. Instead, we assume that all institutional actions are performed thanks to
the counts-as relation which bind the exchange of a certain message to the per-
formance of a certain institutional action. In particular the counts-as relation
represents a constitutive aspect of the construction of institutional reality [27]2.
To model the count-as relation we introduce the notion of convention, that
is, an agreement about what type of message, sent to certain agents, is bound
to a given type of institutional action. In particular conventions are necessary
to specify how an institutional action can be concretely carried out by an agent.
In our model the definition of a convention (i.e., statements of the form
“=conv”) has the following generic form:
ExchMsg(message-type, sender, receivers, content) =conv
iaction(parameters)
Where the fundamental message-type that can be used to perform institu-
tional actions is declare; the sender is the agent that sends the message, the
receivers attribute expresses (when it is necessary) the set of agents that should
receive the message given that they are affected by the performance of the act;
the content attribute is used to determine the value of certain parameters of
the institutional action or, in case the message-type is declare, is used to single
out the type and the parameters of the related institutional action.
For example the following convention binds a certain message exchange with
the performance of the openAuction institutional action on condition that all
the participants of an auction must receive the message:
ExchMsg(declare, sender, participant, openAuction(parameters))
=conv openAuction(parameters)
By itself, a convention is not sufficient to guarantee the successful perfor-
mance of an institutional action by the exchange of the appropriate message:
indeed, some additional conditions must be satisfied about the agent that sends
2Following Searle [27], the construction of social reality in the human world is possible
thanks to constitutive rules of the form X counts as Y in C.
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the message and about the state of the system in relation to the content of the
message.
Conditions on the sender of the message. The sender of the message must
be authorized to perform an institutional action. In the specification of an
interaction system authorizations are expressed in term of roles; for example,
only the auctioneer can open an auction by sending a suitable message to the
participants. Moreover an authorization can be given only if certain conditions
about the state of the system, expressed by suitable Boolean expressions, are
satisfied. For example, it may be established that an auction may be validly
opened only if there are at least two participants. Therefore, we abstractly
define the authorization to perform a specific institutional action (with given
parameters) associating it to a role as follows:
Auth(role, iaction(parameters), conditions)
It is worth highlighting that authorizations are a necessary condition for the
successful performance of an institutional action and that designers should spec-
ify a set of authorizations whenever they introduce a new institutional action.
As we will see in Section 4, this fact allows us to assume that every authorized
institutional action that is not prohibited is permitted.
We decided to separate the notion of convention and authorization because
we find it very useful. For example it is part of a possible convention of voting
that, under appropriate conditions that have to be specified, raising one’s hand
counts as voting ”aye.” Which agents are authorized to exploit such a convention
is a different matter, which we find natural to regard as external with respect to
the convention. Note that one can modify the set of agents that are authorized
to vote without changing the voting conventions.
Conditions about the state of the system. All the preconditions of the insti-
tutional action associated to the performance of the exchange of the message
must be satisfied; for instance, an auction cannot be closed if it has not been
opened yet.
To conclude the exchange of a message counts-as the performance of an
institutional action if and only if: the type of the message is conventionally
associated to the type of institutional action and all contextual conditions hold.
2.3 Event-Condition-Action Rules
The last component of our metamodel is represented by Event-Condition-Action
rules, which allow us to model the fact that institutional reality may change as
a consequence of the occurrence of certain events. For example, a competition
may start at a fixed time instant and be considered closed at another time
without an agent having declared it. ECA rules are also useful to model how
the performance an institutional action executed within an institution may affect
another institution (see for example [35]).
Inspired by Active Database models, we define an ECA rule as composed by
three elements:
1. an event template, which represents the class of events which may activate
the rule.
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2. a condition, expressed through a Boolean OCLExpression, which can re-
fer to the variable e which contains a description of the event that has
activated the rule.
3. a nonempty set of institutional actions which are executed by the rules.
The semantics of ECA rules is given as usual: when an event matching the
description given by the event template occurs in the system, the variable e is
filled with the event instance and the condition is evaluated; if the condition
is verified, the set of institutional actions are executed and their effects are
brought about in the system. We assume that the system is authorized by
default to perform every institutional action. In our model, ECA rules are
specified according to the following notation:
on e: event-template
if condition then
do institutionalAction(parameters)+
As we will see in Section 4, we define norms as ECA rules that perform
institutional actions creating, cancelling or modifying commitments. Therefore,
before introducing norms, we need to define the Basic Institutions, that is, the
artificial institution that defines what social commitments are.
3 The Basic Institution
The Basic Institution is the institution that defines a fundamental concept: the
notion of social commitment. The importance of commitment is due to the fact
that, from our perspective, it is essential to express the meaning of most types
of communicative acts (see [14, 15]) and because it is used to define norms as
will be shown in Section 4. Therefore we assume that the Basic Institution has
to be used, together with other special institutions, in the specification of every
open interaction framework.
The Basic Institution is an artificial institution that defines the ontology of
commitment, the institutional actions necessary to operate on it, and a set of
authorizations for the performance of these institutional actions. In general,
institutions also define sets of norms to regulate the behaviour of agents, but in
our current view, the Basic Institution does not specify norms. In this section
we report a fragment of the Basic Institution for a complete specification see
[15].
Other institutions, that we call special institutions, can then be defined to
model the aspects of institutional reality typical of certain application domains.
For instance, for electronic commerce applications it will be necessary to model
the institutions of ownership, money, business transactions, auctions, and so on.
A detailed specification of the English auction, of the Dutch Auction, and of
the Auction House as special institutions, can be found in [15, 35].
3.1 Commitments and Temporal Propositions
In this paper we give only a short description of our model of commitment and of
temporal proposition [6], that are used to represent the content of commitments.
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Figure 2: Class diagram of the ontology of the Basic Institution
A commitment is characterized by the following attributes: a debtor, a creditor,
a content, and a state. Figure 2 represents the class diagram of the ontology
of the Basic Institution. In the rest of the paper we will refer to commitments
using the following notation:
Comm(state, debtor, creditor, content)
The content of commitments is expressed using temporal propositions. A
temporal proposition is characterized by a statement about a state of affairs
or about an action. The statement is referred to a time interval with two
possible different modes: exist (∃) or for all (∀). The truth-value of a temporal
proposition is initially undefined (⊥). It becomes true, thanks to an event
driven routine, if the mode is for all and the statement is true for every instant
of the associated time interval or if the mode is exist and the statement is true
for some instant in the associated time interval, otherwise it becomes false.
Temporal propositions are represented with the following notation:
TP (statement, [tstart, tend],mode, truth-value)
A commitment undergoes the life cycle described in [14] by reacting either to
institutional actions performed by agents or to domain-dependent events, which
modify the truth value of the temporal proposition in its content. If its temporal
proposition becomes true, the commitment becomes fulfilled ; if it becomes false
the commitment becomes violated. For instance the commitment of agent a1
to agent a2 to open the auctioni within 10 minutes from now (or between now
and now + 10) is represented as:
Comm(pending, a1, a2, TP (open(a1, auctioni), [now, now+10m], ∃,⊥))
In our framework every agent is authorized to create a commitment by
performing the makeCommitment institutional action, whose successful per-
formance creates an unset commitment. The debtor of an unset commitment
may refuse it by executing setCancel, or it may undertake the proposed commit-
ment by executing setPending. We represent a refused commitment by means
of the cancelled state, whereas an accepted commitment is depicted with the
pending state. The creditor of a pending or unset commitment can always set
it to cancelled. Here, due to space limitation, we report only the definition
of one institutional action and of one authorization. The institutional action
makePendingComm, used in Section 4, creates a pending commitment and its
execution coincides with the sequential performance of makeCommitment and
setPending :
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name : makePendingComm(debtor, creditor, content)
pre : not Comm.allInstances()→ exists(c|c.debtor = debtor
and c.creditor = creditor and c.content = content)
post : Comm.allInstances()→ exists(c|c.state=pending and
c.debtor=debtor and c.creditor=creditor and
c.content = content)
Every registered agent RegAgt is authorized to create a commitment having
itself as debtor:
Auth(RegAgt,makePendingComm(debtor, creditor, content),
RegAgt = debtor).
4 Norms
In Section 2.2 we have defined the counts-as relation among actions that repre-
sents a constitutive aspect of the construction of institutional reality [27]. In this
section we will tackle the problem of how to describe the regulative counterpart,
that is, the definition of norms.
In the literature, it is possible to find two different approaches to the spec-
ification of norms for open systems. The more formal approach uses deontic
logic to express the semantics of norms and is more suitable when the goal is
to verify the consistency of a set of norms [9]. The other approach focuses on
the operational aspects of norms, and is more suitable when the goal is the
actual implementation of norms in open systems [33, 17]. In this paper we
study the formalization of norms from the institutional and operational per-
spective(opposite to the agent perspective [33]) , that is, our goal is to define
norms that make the evolution of the state of an interaction system partially
predictable without violating the autonomy of the interacting agents. In order
to reach this purpose, norms describe, on the basis of the state of the system, the
expected behaviour of the agents playing different roles, and make it possible
to detect deviations from such a behaviour, that is, the violation of obligations
and prohibitions defined in the system.
As already said in Section 2.3 in our model norms are a special type of ECA
rules characterized by the fact that when they are fired by events happening in
the system, they create or cancel commitments to perform or to not perform an
action within a certain interval of time, thus affecting each agent that satisfies a
suitable selection expression. Usually the collection of liable agents corresponds
to the set of agents that play a given role in the institution.
From our point of view, commitments are not a specialization of norms as in
[20] and norms are not themselves a special kind of commitments as in [3] and
[28]. We perceive norms as rules that manipulate commitments of the agents
engaged in an interaction. This because in the abstract formalization of a sys-
tem it is important to model norms associated to roles rather than to individual
agents, whereas during the actual evolution of the system it is fundamental
to create commitments associated to individual agents and to detect their ful-
fillment or violation. Obviously such violations can be interpreted also as the
violation of the corresponding norm.
In our model, when an agent fills a role in a software system implementing an
institution, the norms of that institution will create commitments binding the
11
agent to the system, which will be itself regarded as an agent. The identity of
the creditor agent allows keeping trace of the commitments created by a system
and thus, in case of need depending on the application domain, distinguishing
them from the ones created by other agents.
The general structure of a norm can be described as follows:
on e : event-template
if condition then
foreach agent in selection-expression
do commitment-Ops
where agent is an identifier varying on the set of agents that satisfy the
selection expression; selection-expression is a list of agent identifiers or a role
defined in a certain artificial institution; commitment-operations is a sequence
of commitment operations defined using BNF notation as follows:
commitment-Ops := comm-Op | comm-Op, commitment-Ops
comm-Op := makePendComm(agent, instAgent, content)|
cancelComm(agent, instAgent, content)
content := TP (action, [t, t], ∃) | TP (¬action, [t, t],∃)
t := now | event.time | instant | now+number | event.time+number
where action is an institutional action as described in Section 2; now is the
time of the system when the temporal proposition is created and instant is an
instant of time.
In [15] we give a formalization of the English Auction Institution. Here we
report only an example of a norm that creates an obligation for the auctioneer
to open the auction when the start time has elapsed, if at least two agents have
been registered as participants:
on e: TimeEvent(UnsetEnglishAuction.startT ime)
if UnsetEnglishAuction.participant.sizeOf() >= 2 then
foreach agent in UnsetEnglishAuction.auctioneer
do makePendingComm(agent, institutionalAgent,
TP (openAuction(UnsetEnglishAuction.id), [now, now + δ], ∃))
where δ is the time allowed to the agent to fulfill its obligation.
4.1 Deontic relations
Using our metamodel of artificial institutions and the definition of norms it is
possible to represent fundamental deontic relations between agents:
• Obligations are represented by commitments, created by norms, to per-
form an action of a given type. It may happen that agents do not perform
obligatory actions; in such a case the commitment becomes violated and
the system does not evolve to the expected new state.
• An action is prohibited when a norm has created a commitment not to
perform it. The main difference between prohibition and the absence of
authorization resides in the effects of the action: if an agent is prohibited
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to perform action ai but performs it anyway, the effects of the action take
place and the commitment to not perform the action is violated; differently
if an institutional action ai is not authorized neither the counts-as relation
will hold, nor the effects of ai will take place.
When commitments that represent obligations or prohibitions are violated
is up to the system to impose sanctions to the misbehaving agent, and possibly
recover the system to a safe state. The treatment of sanctions, either direct (fine,
expulsion) or indirect (trust, reputation), and the study of plans to recover the
system from unsafe states are a wide and interesting research problem we plan
to tackle in the future.
Regarding permission, if an action is not prohibited (and in case it is an
institutional actions it is also authorized) it is permitted. This definition is
close to the notion of weak permission discussed in deontic logic [36].
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have described in short our operational model of artificial
institutions that can be used for the specification of open interaction systems.
In particular, we have focused on the definition of a syntax and an intuitive
semantics of the concepts that an agent, or its designer, has to take into account
and to reason on, in order to be able to interact properly with different systems.
Existing proposals for the definition of electronic institutions like the one
proposed in the EIDE platform [12, 11], the one presented by Cliffe and Padget
[4], or the OMNI framework [34] are mainly focused on the specification of the
normative component. Unlike them, our model includes also the concepts for
defining the institutional reality of the system.
As far as the formalization of normative aspects is concerned, likewise the
other mentioned proposals, we distinguish among permission, obligation, and
prohibition. We also distinguish between normative aspects and facts dealing
with institutional power [19], which separate meaningful/empowered actions
from meaningless actions that do not have an effect. In our opinion, this last
type of fact, like in [1], should be considered as part of the declarative apparatus
of an electronic institution, and not of the normative one. Indeed we think that
norms regulate agent interaction by indicating, among all meaningful actions
at a certain stage, those that are obliged or forbidden. Moreover an interesting
aspect of our proposal is its uniformity; in fact, our operational formalization of
norms uses the same concepts used for the definition of the semantics of ACL,
that is, social commitments. Therefore, differently from [12, 31, 11], where
the semantics of the communicative acts is given in terms of predefined state
transitions, in our model it is possible to define an application independent
semantics of a Communicative Act Library, as presented in [15], with a syntax
compatible with FIPA-ACL [16].
In [2], the authors propose to model a control mechanism as a normative
agent, which is an autonomous agent whose goals and beliefs represent norms
and constitutive rules. Such model is suitable for an agent that wants to reason
about the norms of the systems or to check, at design time, the effectiveness of
a control mechanism. In contrast with their model, we do not think that the
system of norms constitutes an agent which can autonomously decide whether
and how to enforce norms. Instead, in our view, interactions that take place in
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an open system, modelled and regulated by an institution, are constantly mon-
itored and norms are automatically applied whenever their conditions are met.
For this reason, we propose to model norms as rules that create commitments.
A few proposals have been put forward to implement institutions. Automatic
translations of the language presented in [12] to specify electronic institutions
into executable programs have been presented in [11, 31]. In particular, in
[11] the authors define an architecture to execute and monitor specifications of
electronic institutions, while in [31] such specifications are translated into Prolog
programs, which can be used to simulate the behaviour of a system and to check
simple properties. Also, [31] defines a precise semantics for labels associated to
transitions of electronic institutions. [26] presents the concept of computational
institution, which is “regarded as a virtual organization ruled by norms‘”. In
particular, they propose a possible mapping of normative and constitutive rules
over the abstraction provided by TuCSoN [25], an existing infrastructure to
implement open systems. In [26] the authors focus their attention more on the
proposal of a specific architecture than on the definition of the concepts needed
to specify an institution. Instead, the attention of this paper has been devoted
more on the conceptualization of the institutional notions needed to specify an
institution, and we think that a considerable advantage of our approach is its
independence of a specific architecture or implementation language, which is an
important feature of open systems.
Several research questions are still open, and will be tackled in future works.
We will investigate the development of methods for discovering inconsistencies
among the specification of one or more artificial institutions. In particular, we
are interested in verifying during the specification phase whether certain norms
may create obligations to perform unauthorized actions, or under what condi-
tions two norms may generate conflicting commitments. We plan to investigate
how to model the notion of strong permission and moreover we intend to devise
an explicit representation of the sanctions and repair procedures connected to
the violation of commitments.
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